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A Note on the Redistributive Effect of Immigration 
 
In this paper, we study gains and losses that accrue to natives because of immigration. The gain 
on the aggregated level is called the ‘immigration surplus’, which can be seen as analogous to a 
consumer surplus. We derive changes in the earnings of native owners of production factors by 
employing a stylized model with capital and two types of labour. We claim that the changes in 
earnings are larger than reported by previous studies, and we propose a new method to tally 
them up to the immigration surplus.  
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1  Introduction
1 
This paper uses a simple economic framework elaborated by Borjas (1999) to calculate gains 
and losses that accrue to different groups in a host country because of immigration. Natives 
benefit from immigration on the aggregated level as long as immigrants and natives differ in 
their productive endowments, for instance with respect to skills. The benefits are, however, not 
evenly distributed over the native population: natives who have productive endowments that 
complement those of immigrants gain, while natives who have endowments that compete with 
those of immigrants lose. In this paper, we claim that the gains and losses within the native 
population are larger than reported by Borjas. 
 
For the sake of transparency, we first consider an economy with two production factors: capital 
and labour. We show that immigration leads to an overall net gain for natives (‘the immigration 
surplus’). The net gain is, however, composed of gains and losses of different groups within the 
population. We deviate from Borjas by proposing a different method to tally up the gains and 
losses. We provide simulations to illustrate the differences in outcomes between the methods. 
Next, we show how our method generalizes to an economy with capital and two types of labour 
as production factors.  
2  Model with two production factors 
Suppose the production technology in the host country can be summarized by a twice-
differentiable and continuous linear homogeneous aggregate production function with two 
inputs, capital K and labour L, so that output Q=f(K,L). The work force L contains N native and 
M immigrant workers, and all workers are perfect substitution in production (L=M+N). Natives 
own the entire capital stock in the host country. Finally, the supplies of native and immigrant 
workers do not react to changes in wages (i.e. the supplies are perfectly inelastic). 
 
In a competitive economy, each factor price equals the respective value of marginal 
productivity. Let the price of output Q be the numeraire. The rental rate of capital in the pre-
immigration equilibrium is r0=fK(K,N) and the price of labour is w0=fL(K,N). Because the 
aggregate production function exhibits constant returns to scale, the entire output is distributed 
to the owners of capital and to workers. In the pre-immigration regime, the national income 
accruing to natives QN is given by 
L w K r QN 0 0 + =     (2.1) 
 
1 The authors wish to thank Nick Draper, Ate Nieuwenhuis, Daniel van Vuuren and participants of seminars at CPB and IZA 
for their valuable comments.  
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Figure 2.1  The immigration surplus 












Figure 2.1 illustrates the demand for labour at different wages in the form of a (compensated) 
demand curve fL. The labour demand curve will not be affected by immigration, as we assume 
the stock of capital to be fixed. Curve S represents labour supply without immigrants and thus 
with a number of N native workers, while S’ represents labour supply with an additional number 
of M immigrant workers. Flexible wages allow the economy to reach equilibrium in which 
supply and demand meet. In the initial equilibrium B the wage is equal to w0. The entry of M 
immigrants shifts the labour supply curve, leading to a new equilibrium C with wage w0. 
 
How does immigration affect the incomes of the different groups of the native population? We 
do a welfare analysis using the property that the area under the labour demand curve is equal to 
the economy’s total output. Figure 2.1 shows that immigration increases total output from 
trapezoid ABN0 to ACL0, implying a gain of trapezoid BCLN. A large part of it, rectangle 
DCLN, will be paid to immigrants in the form of wages. The rest, triangle BCD, will accrue to 
natives. This increase in total earnings is called ‘the immigration surplus’.  
 
As the demand curve may be nonlinear, triangle BCD is an approximation of the immigration 
surplus ∆QN. The area of the triangle is given by ½(w0 – w1)M.  Furthermore, as we cannot 
observe wages with and without immigration at the same time we also need to approximate the 
difference in wages. We use a first order approximation: (w0 – w1) ≈ – (∂w/∂L)M. Thus, the 
immigration surplus (as a fraction of national income Q) will be approximated as follows:   































































  (2.2) 
where αL is labour’s share of national income; εLL is the elasticity of factor price for labour 
(holding marginal cost constant); and m is the fraction of the work force that is immigrant.  
 
A ‘back-of-the-envelope’ calculation for the United States, with a share of labour in national 
income α of about 70%, an elasticity of factor price for labour εLL of - 0.3 (Hamermesh, 1993) 
2 
and a fraction of immigrants in the labour force m of about 10%, gives an immigration surplus 
on the order of 0.1% of GDP. 
 
Immigration redistributes income from labour to capital. In terms of Figure 2.1, native workers 
lose the area in rectangle w0BDw1, and this quantity plus the immigration surplus accrues to 
capital owners. Expressed as a fraction of GDP, the immigration surplus consists of the net 
changes in incomes of native workers and capital owners: 











  (2.3) 
Both the gain of capital owners and the loss of workers may be calculated by using the same 
first order approximation as we used for the previous equation: (w0 – w1) ≈ – (∂w/∂L)M and 
(r0 – r1) ≈ – (∂r/∂L)M. The resulting immigration surplus can be written as a weighted sum of 





























N a a   (2.4) 
with weighting factors αK
m=αK
 and αL





















2 Hamermesh (1993) concludes that the elasticity of labour demand is about - 0.3. Under the assumptions of a competitive 
economy and a labour’s share in national income of 70%, the elasticity of factor price of labour is about - 0.3 as well.  
3 From here on we start to deviate from Borjas (1999)  
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These elasticities can be interpreted as the effect of immigration on factor prices as they consist 
of labour supply elasticities of factor prices, εKL and εLL, times the amount of immigration m. 
 
As the immigration surplus of equation (2.2) and the gains and losses of the production factors 
of equation (2.4) are based on first order approximations, it is not obvious that tallying up the 
gains and losses leads to the same size of the immigration surplus. In fact, using the identity 
αKεKL+αLεLL=0, it can be shown that the immigration surplus of the latter equation is twice as 
large as the one reported by the former equation.  
Table 2.1  Simulation of economic costs and benefits from immigration
a 
  On the basis of       
  the elasticities  Method 1  Method 2  Method 3 
Earnings of capital (rental rate) 
b  7.00  6.67  3.50  7.00 
Earnings of labour (wage) 
b  - 3.00  - 3.00  - 1.50  - 3.00 
         
Immigration surplus 
c    0.11  0.11  0.11 
Total native earnings of capital 
c    2.00  1.05  2.10 
Total native earnings of labour 
c    - 1.89  - 0.94  - 1.99 
 
a All simulations assume that the labour share in national income α is 70%; that the elasticity of factor price for labour supply εLL is - 0.3 
and that the fraction of immigrants is the workforce is 10%. The explanation of the calculation methods can be found in the text of this 
section. 
b
 Change in percentages. 
c
 Change in percentages of GDP. 
 
Calculation methods 
In this paper, we maintain the hypothesis that equation (2.2) gives the most reasonable 
approximation of the immigration surplus. Borjas (1999) does so as well. Arguments in favour 
of this approximation are that it is derived directly from Figure 2.1 and that the literature on 
consumer surpluses uses a same kind of approximation. The ultimate goal of this paper is 
therefore to find an approximation method for the amount of redistribution that is consistent 
with the immigration surplus of equation (2.2).  
 
We discuss different methods to approximate the amount of redistribution. For illustration 
purposes, Table 2 presents the effects of immigration on earnings and total earnings for the 
same example as used above. The first column presents the effect on earnings: in case of an 
elasticity of factor price for labour εLL of - 0.3, a fraction of immigrants of 10% implies a 
decrease in wages of 3% and an increase in the return of capital of 7% (using the identity 
αKεKL+αLεLL=0). The amount of redistribution between the native production factors should be 
in line with these price effects. We now discuss three approximation methods: two proposed by 
Borjas, and one proposed by us.  
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Method 1 (Borjas; 1999, section 2.1) uses the linear approximation to calculate the total loss in 
earnings of workers: (w0 – w1) ≈ – (∂w/∂L)M. The loss is approximated as follows: 
( )
) 1 ( 0 1 m m
Q
w w N
LL L - »
-
e a   (2.6) 
The gain of capital owners is calculated as a remainder by adding up the absolute value of the 
loss of workers and the immigration surplus. In the example of Table 2.1 the total loss in 
earnings of workers is 1.89% of GDP and the total gain in earnings of capital owners is 2.00% 
of GDP. As the capital share in national income is 30%, the increase in the earnings of capital is 
6.67% (2.00% divided by 0.3) and not 7.00% as one would expect.  
 
Method 2 (Borjas; 1999, section 2.2) is based on the notion that when the partial derivatives of 
factor prices ∂r/∂M and ∂w/∂M are evaluated at the initial equilibrium, without immigration, the 
infinitesimal increase in national income accruing to natives is zero (Bagwati and Srivivasan, 
1993). To calculate finite changes, we evaluate the immigration surplus using an ‘average’ rate 














































  (2.7) 
Borjas (1999) applies this notion to the case of an economy with three production factors; we 
discuss this economy in the next section. In practice, Borjas ‘averages’ the price effects of 
immigration leading to effects of immigration that are too small. The example of Table 2.1 
shows that the changes in earnings are halved compared to the results on the basis of the labour 
supply elasticities. 
 
Note that for both methods 1 and 2, we need to multiply the change in earnings of capital by the 
capital share in national income (30%) to get change in total native earnings. To get the change 
in total native earnings of labour, we need to multiply the change in earnings by the labour 
share in national income (70%) and by the native population share (0.9). 
 
Method 3 is our own proposal: as we believe that the elasticities of factor prices, εKL and εLL, 
should be used to approximate the price effects of immigration, we need to find weighting 
factors for equation (2.4) that give the immigration surplus of equation (2.2). Define:  






























m)/2 (i=K,L) where αi
0 is the share in national income of natives assuming that 
all inhabitants are natives (αK
0=αK and αL
0=αL) and αi
 m is the share in national income of natives 
assuming that a fraction m of workers are immigrants (αK
m=αK and αL
m=(1- m)αL). So where 
method 2 averages the price effects of immigration, our method averages the weighting factors. 
It can be shown that equation (2.8) leads to the immigration surplus of equation (2.2).  
 
According to method 3, the effect of immigration on the earnings are by definition equal to the 
effect on basis of the elasticities, see Table 2.1. Method 1 gives outcomes that are close to the 
outcomes of method 3. As both methods are approximations, it is not possible to draw 
conclusions on the accuracy of the two methods. The only disadvantage of method 1 is its 
arbitrariness: the gains of capital owners are calculated as a remainder term, but one could as 
well calculate the loss of the workers as a remainder term.  
 
Though the three methods differ with respect to the effects of immigration on earnings of labour 
and capital, they all generate the same immigration surplus. Methods 1 and 3 give price effects 
of immigration that are (approximately) equal to effects of the basis of the elasticities. Method 2 
gives a kind of ‘average’ price effect of immigration. 
 
In this section, we assumed the stock of capital to be fixed. If the stock of capital would be 
perfectly elastic, the stock of capital adjusts such that the price of capital remains unchanged. 
As a consequence, wages remain unchanged and the immigration surplus is zero. This result 
may change, however, when there more than two production factors. 
3  Model with three production factors 
Suppose there are two types of workers in the host country’s labour market, skilled (Ls) and 
unskilled (Lu). The linear homogenous production function is given by 
[ ] M N b M bN k f L L K f Q U s ) 1 ( ) 1 ( , , ) , , ( b b - + - + = =     (3.1) 
where b and β denote the fraction of skilled workers among natives and among immigrants. The 
production function is twice differentiable, with fi>0 and fi <0 (i=K,Ls,Lu). The price of each 
factor of production, r for capital and wi (i=S,U) for labour, is determined by the respective 
marginal productivity condition.   
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We consider two kinds of economies: one economy with a fixed stock of capital (i.e. perfectly 
inelastic capital) and one with a flexible stock of capital (e.g. perfectly elastic capital). 
Inelastic capital  
Suppose that the stock of capital is fixed and owned by natives. Like for the case with two 
production factors, the rental rate of capital will change because of immigration. Expressed as a 
fraction of GDP the immigration surplus consists of the net changes in incomes of capital 
owners and the different types of native workers: 
( ) ( ) ( )
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  (3.2) 
The changes in total earnings of capital owners and of workers can be approximated by using 
the same methods as used in the Section 2. The immigration surplus can again be written as a 













































Q * * * a a a   (3.3) 
with weighting factors αi
*
 (i=K, S, U). Equations (15) to (17) of Borjas (1999) report the 
expressions for the immigration elasticities.  
 
Borjas employs method 2 to calculate the immigration surplus and the price effects. In other 
words, he uses an ‘average’ rate for the partial derivatives ∂r/∂M, ∂wS/∂M and ∂wS/∂M and as a 
consequence he halves the immigration elasticities. His weighting factors are equal to αK
*=αK, 
αS
* =αS(1- m)(b/pS) and αU
* =αU(1- m)((1- b)/pU) with pS and pU the shares of the work force 
that are skilled and unskilled. 
 
We employ method 3, implying that the weighting factors are: αi
*=(αi
0+αi
m)/2 (i=K,S, U) where 
αi





 m is the share in national income of natives assuming that a fraction m 
of workers are immigrants (αK
m=αK, αS
m=αS(1- m)(b/pS) , αU
m =αU(1- m)((1- b)/pU)). Appendix 
A proves that the immigration surpluses of methods 2 and 3 are equal to each other. 
Elastic capital 
In this economy the stock of capital adjusts such that the rental rate of capital does not change. 
To determine the impact of immigration on the earnings of the two types of labour we need to 
know how the stock of capital adjusts. We know that  
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  (3.5) 
The immigration elasticities of wages can be derived under the condition that equation (3.5) 
holds, see equations (10) and (11) of Borjas (1999). The immigration surplus can again be 









































a a   (3.6) 
To calculate the immigration surplus, Borjas employs method 2 while we employ method 3. In 
both cases the weigthing factors are the same as for the economy with inelastic capital. One can 
proof that the immigration surpluses resulting from methods 2 and 3 are equal to each other, see 
Appendix A.  
Simulations 
To illustrate the differences between the two methods we provide simulations that extent the 
‘back-of-the-envelope’ calculations of Section 2. To do this, we need to aggregate the labour 
market into two skill groups. We follow the second example of Borjas (1999), which is based 
on high-school and college equivalents in the US labour market. Using data from the Current 
Population Survey, he reports that 43% and 33% of the work force and the immigrant workers 
are high skilled (ps=0.43 and β=0.33), and that the share of income accruing to skilled and to 
unskilled workers equal 37.1% and 32.9% (αS=0.371 and αU=0.329). 
 
The outcomes of the simulations will crucially depend on the responsiveness of factor prices to 
increases in labour supply. Borjas used the following range for the vector (εSS,εUU): 
(- 0.5, - 0.3), (- 0.9,- 0.6), and (- 1.5,- 0.8). The cross elasticity εSU is set to 0.05 in all 
simulations. Because an elasticity matrix needs to fulfil two identities these assumptions 
determine all elasticities.
4 To give an example, in the case of (εSS,εUU)=(- 0.5, - 0.3) the matrix 
of elasticities will be as follows: 
 
4 The row-wise sum and the column-wise weighted average of an elasticity matrix should equal zero.  


























300 . 0 056 . 0 244 . 0
050 . 0 500 . 0 450 . 0








    (3.7) 
For the economy with inelastic capital, the price effects of immigration can be calculated 
directly from the elasticity matrix. The reason is that in this economy only prices react to 
immigration, while quantities stay unchanged (except for changes due to immigration). In the 
example, a fraction of immigrants in the labour force of 10% implies that 7.7% and 11.8% of 
skilled and unskilled workers are immigrants (10%x(β/ps) and 10%x(1- β)/(1- ps)). The price 










































































S     (3.8) 
According to the elasticity matrix, immigration decreases wages of skilled and unskilled 
workers by 3.3% and 3.1%. The rental rate of capital increases by 7.4%. The effects of 
immigration in an economy with inelastic capital cannot be derived directly from the elasticity 
matrix E as the quantity of capital adjusts (instead of the rental rate of capital). 
 
Table 3.1 presents the full set of simulations. The outcomes of equation (3.8) are reported in the 
third column of the upper panel. For the same case, Borjas reports that wages of skilled and 
unskilled workers decrease by only 1.5% and 1.4%. The difference between the two methods is 
larger than a factor 2; see footnote c of Table 3.1. If capital is perfectly elastic the change in 
wages is substantially smaller, but the difference between the two methods remains. 
 
For the case with large elasticities (εSS,εUU)=(- 1.5, - 0.8), unskilled workers experience a 
decline in wages of about 9.0% (inelastic capital) or 2.3% (elastic capital) according to Method 
3. Method 2 gives a decline of about 4.0% or 1.0%. To our opinion, the difference is rather 
substantial and thus clearly underreports the impact of immigration on wages.  
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Table 3.1  Simulation of economic costs and benefits from immigration 
a,b 
                  Method 2 
c                  Method 3   
  Capital  Capital    Capital  Capital   
  Inelastic  Elastic    Inelastic  Elastic   
Assume (εSS,εUU)=(- - - - 0.5,- - - - 0.3)             
Earnings of capital  3,71      7,41     
Earnings of skilled labour  - 1,50  0,37    - 3,25  0,80   
Earnings of unskilled labour  - 1,36  - 0,40    - 3,09  - 0,90   
Immigration surplus  0,11  0,01    0,11  0,01   
             
Assume (εSS,εUU)=(- - - - 0.9,- - - - 0.6)             
Earnings of capital  7,54      15,07     
Earnings of skilled labour  - 2,92  0,67    - 6,32  1,46   
Earnings of unskilled labour  - 2,92  - 0,73    - 6,62  - 1,65   
Immigration surplus  0,22  0,01    0,22  0,01   
             
Assume (εSS,εUU)=(- - - - 1.5,- - - - 0.8)             
Earnings of capital  11,67      23,35     
Earnings of skilled labour  - 5,04  0,95    10,92  2,05   
Earnings of unskilled labour  - 3,96  - 1,02    - 8,97  - 2,32   
Immigration surplus  0,33  0,02    0,33  0,02   
             
a All simulations assume a labour share in national income of 70%, that εSU=0.05, and that the fraction of immigrants in the workforce is 
10%. The values for the other parameters are: ps=0.43, β=0.33, αS=0.371 and αU=0.329. All entries are changes in percentages, except 
for the immigration surplus which a percentage of GDP.  
b
 An Excel-spreadsheet to calculate the effects of immigration is available upon request with the authors.  
c
 In Table 1 of Borjas (1999) the changes in earnings of skilled and unskilled workers are additionally multiplied by (1- m)(b/ps) and 
(1- m)((1- b)/ pu). 
 
4  Conclusions 
In this paper, we study gains and losses that accrue to natives because of immigration. The gain 
of the aggregated level is called the ‘immigration surplus’, which can be seen as analogous to a 
consumer surplus. While welfare analyses often do not investigate redistributive effects as they 
are mostly based on partial models, we employ a stylized model that allows us to investigate the 
impact of immigration on the earnings of all production factors. Surprisingly, it turns out to be 
less than straightforward to tally up the changes in earnings to the immigration surplus. We 
propose a method that deviates from Borjas (1999). 
 
We employ a stylized model with three production factors: capital and two types of labour. We 
assume natives and immigrants to be perfect substitutes in production within a type of labour.  
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Like Borjas, we find that the immigration surplus is small compared to the amounts involved in 
redistribution between natives. We find, however, that the amounts involved in redistribution 
are substantially larger than reported by Borjas. 
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Appendix A: Immigration surpluses  
In the economy with three production factors and with capital being inelastic, the immigration 
surpluses according to methods 2 and 3 are equal. Take the immigration surplus according to 
Method 3: 
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3
 
The crucial part of the proof is that the first part of the equation is zero. The three immigration 
elasticities of prices are linear functions of the labour supply elasticities εij (i,j=K,S,U), see 
equation (15) to (17) of Borjas (1999). As the weighting factors are defined αi
0=αi (i=K,S,U), 
the first part of the equation is zero because of the identity αKεKi+αSεS +αUεUi=0 (i=K,S,U). This 
gives:  





































































































































The proof for the immigration surpluses with elastic capital is analogous 